Του Νίκου Αθηναίου
Κυκλοφόρησαν σήμερα οι προβλέψεις του ιδρύματος γεωπολιτικών μελετών και αναλύσεων STRATFOR για το 2ο τρίμηνο του 2016, που, μεταξύ άλλων, προβλέπουν ότι «η Ελλάδα θα βρίσκεται διαρκώς αντιμέτωπη με την απειλή πολιτικής και κοινωνικής εξέγερσης» ως συνέπεια του γεγονότος ότι ναι μεν «η ελληνική Κυβέρνηση θα έρθει σε συμφωνία με τους δανειστές της και θα λάβει την επόμενη δόση του δανείου» το οποίο «σημαίνει ότι η χρεωκοπία και έξοδος από το ευρώ για την Ελλάδα θα καθυστερήσουν», αλλά, «η συμφωνία θα έχει κόστος» για την Αθήνα, δηλαδή, την «εξασθένιση της λαϊκής υποστήριξης και την βαθμιαία διάβρωση των κοινωνικών δικτύων ασφάλισης για τα ελληνικά νοικοκυριά».
Το STRATFOR δεν αποκλείει την πιθανότητα Ελλάδα, Ουγγαρία και Ιταλία να χρησιμοποιήσουν το θέμα των κυρώσεων κατά της Ρωσίας ως διαπραγματευτικό χαρτί έναντι των Βρυξελλών για τις αναπροσαρμογές στο ύψος των ελλειμμάτων των προϋπολογισμών τους, την οικονομική βοήθεια προς αυτές, τους όρους των προγραμμάτων διάσωσης, και το θέμα των διαφόρων συμφωνιών που έχουν συνάψει οι κακές τράπεζες.
Οι οικονομικές κυρώσεις της ΕΕ κατά της Ρωσίας δεν θα αρθούν στο τέλος του Ιουλίου, αλλά επειδή η παράτασή τους προϋποθέτει την ομόφωνη απόφαση των 28 μελών της ΕΕ, η Ρωσία θα προσπαθήσει στους αμέσως προσεχείς μήνες να επηρεάσει τις τρεις αυτές χώρες που είναι εναντίον των κυρώσεων να ψηφίσουν κατά της συνέχισής τους. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, η Μόσχα θα προσπαθήσει, επίσης, να αξιοποιήσει πολιτικά το διεθνές οικονομικό φόρουμ που θα γίνει στην Πετρούπολη τον ερχόμενο Ιούνιο, στο οποίο προτίθεται να προσκαλέσει σημαντικές προσωπικότητες από τις ευρωπαϊκές ελίτ.
Η πρόβλεψη για τη Συνθήκη Σένγκεν είναι ότι «η Ελλάς θα παραμείνει μέλος της Συνθήκης» με την υποστήριξη της Γερμανίας και της Ιταλίας, παρά το γεγονός ότι σύνορα όμορων χωρών της θα παραμείνουν κλειστά και θα ενταθούν οι έλεγχοι στα σύνορα και άλλων ευρωπαϊκών χωρών πολλές από τις οποίες διαφωνούν με την μετακίνηση μεταναστών στα εδάφη τους.
Η ροή των μεταναστών «προς την Ελλάδα από τη Μέση Ανατολή θα συνεχιστεί με τη βελτίωση των καιρικών συνθηκών μέσω του Αιγαίου παρά την πρόσφατη ελληνοτουρκική συμφωνία σκοπός της οποίας ήταν η μείωση των ροών των προσφύγων». Ταυτόχρονα, οι μετανάστες θα επιδιώκουν να μετακινούνται προς Ιταλία και μέσω Αλβανίας και Βουλγαρίας, οι οποίες θα αναγκαστούν να ενισχύσουν τους ελέγχους στα σύνορά τους.
MARCH 28, 2016
It’s tempting to blame Syria for all the geopolitical intrigue that will characterize the second quarter of 2016. It is the scene of a protracted civil war, the source of Europe’s migrant crisis and a major complication in Turkey’s struggle with the Kurds. But in truth, Syria is merely a pawn in a larger game played by more powerful countries, each with its own designs in the Middle East.
Chief among them is Russia, which recently withdrew most of its troops from Syria. The military drawdown will not fundamentally alter the civil war, but it will certainly shape the political considerations of the countries invested in the conflict’s outcome. Perhaps that was Moscow’s intention all along. The Kremlin likely left, in part, to influence negotiations in Geneva and to extricate itself from a potentially long and costly military commitment. But it also left to try to shape Western perceptions of its actions in the Middle East, particularly before the Europeans decide in July whether they will lift their sanctions against Russia. (NATO members will also discuss plans to expand their presence on Russia’s western flank.) Compelling the Europeans, however, will be easier said than done. Even the countries that are amenable to easing the economic pressure on Russia — Italy, Greece and Hungary, for example — would rather use the sanctions issue to bargain with Brussels for leniency on budget deficits, aid, bailout terms and bad bank deals.
The Russian drawdown will also complicate Turkey’s negotiations with Europe on migration policies. Ankara has little intention of taking hundreds of thousands of migrants off Europe’s hands, but it has tried to use the Continent’s desperation to elicit a number of concessions. The most important is coalition support for Turkey’s military incursion into northern Syria, where Kurdish militants have steadily extended their territory. As Russia scales down its role in the Syrian conflict and calls for the Kurds to be included in peace talks, Turkey will have a greater incentive to insert itself in northern Syria. But it will probably not have the support it needs to do so.
In fact, everyone involved in the Syrian conflict — and its associated conflicts — should manage their expectations. Russia has not yet left Syria, and even though its reduced presence could breathe some life into peace negotiations, few believe it will lead to a sudden and lasting breakthrough. In the meantime, attempts to impose a cease-fire in Syria will be limited, and Europe will keep searching for a viable solution to its immigration crisis as Euroskeptic voices grow louder. Turkey will not be able to get the support it needs to launch an effective offensive into northern Syria, and Kiev, fragile as it is, will be unwilling and unable to make political concessions in eastern Ukraine to satisfy Russia.
As Eurasia struggles to address its issues, the United States and China will shape the global economic climate in the second quarter. The U.S. economy will continue to grow, and the Chinese economy will continue to slow. A stronger dollar will create problems for China, leading to uncertainty that will, in turn, disrupt the U.S. economy. The relationship between the two economies will make global markets more volatile, but the European Central Bank’s monetary stimulus should somewhat shelter the eurozone from the fallout. The same cannot be said for Japan, where a stronger yen and declining asset prices will likely hurt the economy. If they do, the government in Tokyo may enact additional stimulus measures. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom’s June 23 referendum on whether it will leave the European Union will become more important as the quarter progresses, leading to rising instability in the United Kingdom and putting downward pressure on the value of the euro. But things will quickly stabilize if the British decide to stay in the union, as we suspect they will. Elsewhere in the world, smaller, healthier economies may be motivated to loosen monetary policies and weaken their currencies to stay competitive.
The global oil market, for its part, will remain oversupplied in the next three months as Iranian output returns to the market. Coordinating a production freeze will be at the top of OPEC’s agenda during its June meeting, but Iran will refuse to make any significant cuts, as will other major producers. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies would rather wait for the market to slowly correct itself as U.S. output declines over the coming six months, suggesting another difficult quarter ahead for oil exporters.
Europe
Forecast
MAR 28, 2016 | 10:54 GMT
Europe
• The Migration Crisis
• To Brexit or Not
• Developments in the Eurozone Periphery
• Developments in the East
The course of ongoing political fragmentation in Europe will be determined by events in the second quarter. As the weather improves, the flow of migrants from the Middle East into Greece will continue, and an increasing number of migrants will seek to reach Italy. The European Commission and the German government will try to preserve the Schengen Agreement, which allows free movement among countries, but border controls that have become the norm in parts of Europe will remain in place, especially with the bombing attacks in Brussels having reinforced these policies. With Britain scheduled to vote at the end of the quarter on whether to remain in the European Union, efforts in Britain and abroad to keep the country in the Continental bloc will intensify.
The Migration Crisis
Improving weather will make the Aegean Sea easier to cross, prompting migrants from the Middle East to continue to try to reach Greece despite the recent EU-Turkey agreement aimed at reducing migrant flows. In turn, EU members will drag their feet when it comes to accepting the relocation of refugees to their territories.
Unilateral measures such as fences, border controls and asylum quotas will continue. With the main Balkan route almost completely closed, some migrants will seek an alternate passage to Northern Europe, such as through Albania and Bulgaria. Should those countries encounter increased numbers of refugees, however, they will strengthen controls at their borders with Greece.
An increasing number of incoming migrants will head to Italy. Some of the asylum seekers entering Albania will try to reach Italy by crossing the Adriatic Sea. Better conditions on the Mediterranean Sea will reactivate the route connecting North Africa with southern Italy. Italy will react by backing efforts in Brussels for an EU-wide response to the crisis in order to defend the continuity of the Schengen Agreement and to back plans to strengthen the EU presence in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, some of Italy’s neighbors may decide to close their borders to prevent migrants from moving north.
To stem the migrant surge, the European Union will present plans to create a European Border and Coast Guard to coordinate operations with national border authorities. Countries on the European Union’s external borders, such as Italy, Greece, Poland and Hungary, will support the idea but will resist proposals by the European Commission to give Brussels the authority to deploy the agency to a member state without its consent. The proposed guard force will not be established during the quarter.
The quarter will also be defined by debate over the future of the Schengen area. Countries along the Balkan migration route will lobby for the suspension of Greek membership in the Schengen Agreement and the continuation of existing border controls. But Germany and Italy will back Greece, and Greece will remain a member of Schengen zone. Even so, the European Union, especially with the Brussels attacks fresh in everyone’s memory, will tolerate a prolongation of border controls on sensitive parts of the migration routes.
The migration crisis will have political repercussions in Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s position will not be at stake, but the weak performance by her conservative party in March regional elections and gains by the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany party will create dissent within the government. Merkel will continue to look for an EU-wide approach to the migration crisis, but she will not find one, relying instead on a reduced number of countries that still support a plan to relocate migrants to Turkey.
To Brexit or Not
The British referendum on EU membership will take place June 23. Prime Minister David Cameron and several members of his Cabinet, as well as a significant part of the Labor Party, will campaign to remain in the European Union. Rebel Conservative lawmakers and the anti-immigration party UKIP will campaign for leaving. Stratfor expects the United Kingdom to stay in the European Union. Should a Brexit occur, however, it would trigger a political crisis in London, where officials would want to keep negotiation channels open with Europe.
Regardless of the outcome, Cameron’s negotiation with the European Union has opened the door for other governments to make their own demands of the union, backed by threats to hold similar referendums. The British vote has also made it easier for governments to refrain from participating in the effort to deepen the process of Continental integration. The full effect of these changes will be felt well beyond the quarter.
Developments in the Eurozone Periphery
The quarter will be marked by political and economic uncertainty in the eurozone. The Greek government will reach a deal with its lenders and will receive the next tranche of its bailout program. This means a default and a Greek exit from the eurozone will continue to be delayed. But the deal will come at a cost: weakening popular support for Athens and the progressive erosion of social safety nets for Greek households. Accordingly, Greece will face the constant threat of political and social revolt.
In Spain, the main political parties will fail to reach an agreement on forming a government. Intense negotiations to strike a deal will occur, but Spain will nevertheless probably have to hold new elections in late June. This will not lead to a significant economic or financial crisis during the quarter, though the political turmoil and the prospect of a new government, which could backtrack on some of the reforms introduced during the previous administration, will weaken market confidence in Spain. Madrid is likely once again to miss its deficit reduction targets, which will create more problems for Spain. The situation is similar in Portugal, where a fragile government will struggle to convince financial markets of its ability to heal the Portuguese economy. Because the Portuguese government consists of a shaky multiparty coalition, early elections cannot be ruled out. The second quarter will also be eventful for Cyprus, which will hold legislative elections May 22. Should pro-unification forces win, the internationally recognized Greek government in Nicosia will seek to continue negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot government in the north. Although the north and the south are both interested in keeping the negotiations alive, we do not expect any significant developments in the quarter.
The Italian and Portuguese banking systems would likely bear the brunt of any global economic disturbances, such as bad news out of the Chinese or U.S. economies, that affect the European markets. Spain might be vulnerable, too, thanks to political uncertainty in Madrid. Any wobbles are unlikely to be dramatic at this stage, however, since the package of measures unveiled by the European Central Bank on March 10 should provide sufficient buoyancy to asset prices and stability for eurozone banks’ balance sheets.
Developments in the East
Warsaw will take new steps to increase its control over Poland’s political system and economy, which will lead to new frictions with the West. During the quarter, the Polish government will introduce a special tax on supermarkets, a sector with significant foreign investment. Warsaw’s populist moves will also polarize Polish society, and anti-government protests during the quarter will be renewed. But the opposition is weak, and the current government will remain in control.
As the NATO summit approaches in July, Warsaw will continue to demand a stronger military presence by the alliance in Eastern Europe. The Polish government will also look for more political cooperation from fellow members of the Visegrad Group, which also includes Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Poland will seek to coordinate its position on EU issues with that group.
Serbia will hold elections April 24, a vote that probably will not bring significant changes to the country’s foreign policy. The next administration in Belgrade will not change Serbia’s intent to join the European Union while simultaneously protecting ties with Moscow at a time of heightened EU-Russian tensions.
During the final weeks of the quarter, debate over the status of EU sanctions on Russia will grow louder. Some EU members, such as Italy and Hungary, will send signals suggesting that sanctions may not be extended when they expire in late July. But the European Union is not likely to lift sanctions in the second quarter, and will in fact probably keep them in place at least until the end of the year.
All images are courtesy of Getty.
